

Civil Military Relation in Turkey from 1997-2016:

By

¹Muhammad Naseem, ²Abdul Manan

Abstract:

Civil military relation in turkey from 1997 to 2016 Islamic Democracies military intervention and withdrawal. Many time militaries intervene and withdraws the democratic state. Military coups in turkey have recurred frequently. This research studies provides an empirical overview of the civil military relationships in the past few decades and the Turkish army intervention in recent years to capture the command of civilian government. The study emphasis overall consequences of army intervention in Turkey's civilian government affairs and the aftermaths of the intervention, Army failed try of capturing the Capital city and the command of the Turkish government in recent past. Civil military relation in Turkey 1997-2016 have historically been tensed as the Turkish military never accepted Islamic democracies military intervention and withdrawal many times. the research design employs mixed methods technique, acquires qualitative thematic data and validates it against conceptual framework. Simultaneously it acquires quantitative numerical data to obtain societal perspectives from opinion makers in the country and then integrates the two through concurrent triangulation method to extract findings and proffer recommendations.

¹M.Phil. Scholar, Department of Area Study Centre for middle East and Arab Countries, University of Balochistan Quetta Pakistan

²Dr. Abdul Manan, Assistant Professor, Department of Political science, University of Balochistan, Quetta Pakistan

Keywords: Intervention, Emphasis, Tensed, Qualitative, Perspective, Integrate, Etc.

Introduction:

The people of Turkey focus remain control of the Military in countries where people have witnessed Military takeovers, the intervention in Democracy expands to incorporate issues related to Military takeovers, Military regime and transition to Democracy beside civilian control over the Military. Turkey falls in the second country therefore the study of politics, power struggle and process of democratization in Turkey due to repeated Military intervention the elect government. Since inception, the political elite, Military and Judiciary have conflict and colluded in a variety of ways it influences the process of state and nation building. Resultantly the country has alternated between civil and Military rules. till 1997, after a seventeen-year hiatus the first time Turkish armed forces staged a coup without arms during a nation security council meeting on February 28, 1997. Concerned about the continued instability caused by coalition government and the rise of political Islam in Turkey, the armed forces presented to prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan a member of the Islamist welfare party recommendation to curb anti secular activity by his party.in the process of state building to competing binary trends are evident. The civilian political elite prefer a federation with parliamentary system of government 1961 constitution. The 1961 constitution also expanded the right to freedom of association which led to the establishment of numerous autonomous civil society organization and political parties. The alternations between civil and Military rule and attempts to formulate practice two different types of government has had numerous adverse effects.

Civil Military Regimes in Turkey 1923-2016:

Name	Parliamentary System Period
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk	29-10-1923 to 01-11-1927
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk	01-11-1927 to 04-05-1931
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk	04-05-1931 to 01-03-1935
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk	01-03-1935 to 10-11-1938
Abdulhalik Renda	10-11-1938 to 11-11-1938
Ismet Inonu	11-11-1938 to 03-04-1939
Ismet Inonu	03-04-1939 to 08-03-1943
Ismet Inonu	08-03-1943 to 05-08-1946
Ismet Inonu	05-08-1946 to 27-05-1950
Celal Bayar	27-05-1950 to 14-05-1954
Celal Bayar	14-05-1954 to 01-11-1957
Celal Bayar	01-11-1957 to 27-05-1960
General Cemal Gursel	27-05-1960 to 10-10-1961
Cemal Gursel	10-10-1961 to 02-02-1966
Ibrahim Sevki Atasagun	02-02-1966 to 28-03-1966
Cavdet Sunay	28-03-1966 to 28-03-1973
Tekin Arıburn	28-03-1973 to 06-04-1973
Fahri Koruturk	06-04-1973 to 06-04-1980
Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil	06-04-1980 to 12-09-1980
General Denan Evren	12-09-1980 to 09-11-1982
Kenan Evren	09-11-1982 to 09-11-1989
Turgut Ozal	09-11-1989 to 17-04-1993
Husamettin Cindoruk	17-04-1993 to 16-05-1993
Suleyman Demirel	16-05-1993 to 16-05-2000
Ahmet Necdet Sezer	16-05-2000 to 28-08-2007
Abdullah Gul	28-08-2007 to 28-08-2014
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	28-08-2014 to 09-07-2018

The aforementioned history presents contradictory Narratives. The political elite blame the Military interventions and dominance for lack of Democratic consolidation. The Military on the other hand faults political elite for their

undemocratic attitude, inept governance and corruption leading to institutional decay. Turkey military five-time intervention were staged in 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, and 2016 however, it has to be stated that in four cases the military undermentioned as it referred to save the democracy from itself or to protect Turkey from a perceived threat to its state ideology kemalism most notably secularism.

Political decisions introduced army's leadership very into politics, policy formulation and governance arena. As the Turkish military was the institution gaining independence and establishing the new sovereign country it has been regarded as a respected institution. This was evident until the early 2000s, according to the Eurobarometer there was a high public confidence and trust (up to 90 per cent) in the military among all social classes and demographics, considerably higher than other institutions in Turkey and higher than the average EU member state.

Mustafa Kama Ataturk and military valued traditions of Ottoman past but admired western civilization and believed that Turkey had to modernize. To emulate Western civilization and believed that Turkey had to modernize. To emulate Western powers and modernize, Ataturk and the military leadership regarded the creation of a liberal democracy as a necessity, this included a pluralistic political order.

The parliamentary elections held following the 1960 coup generated a weak coalition government between two ideological rivals: The Republican People's Party and the Justice Party. Future parliamentary elections fared no better, and successive and weak coalition governments followed. The resulting political instability and legislative deadlock

The National Security Council, established in the 1961 Constitution as discussed above in section 2.2, became the primary institutional avenue for the Turkish Armed Forces to influence the nation's political affairs.

The institutionalization of the military's influence on Turkish political affairs through the Council allowed the military to assert a firm hand in Turkish politics and with the concomitant onset of weak coalition governments, produced a culture of military coups in Turkey.

Problem Statement:

Research is creating new knowledge" the study of military intervention, takeover and subsequent military rule. The relation between politics and

military takeover and rule makes an interesting case study for understanding the process of democratic consolidation. The foremost problem relates to understanding the reasons for inability of political leaders to consolidate democracy, democratic institutions and values. Turkish peoples could not enjoy full-pledged democracy due to military, war lords, and foreign dirty hands etc. This paper will throw light on Turkey democracy and hurdles on its way.

Hypothesis:

Civil military in Turkey is an interplay of push and pull factors in which, the political elite create conditions which can trigger military intervention or coup and military rule.

Research Question:

Evident from the problem statement cited above, the political elite, their interests and objectives personal a political and the political situation which consequences out of the decisions taken by them to advance these interests emerges as an independent variable. The main dependent variable for this research is the military and its reactions in form of intervention or coup representing the interests, aspirations and outlook of the military elite. In this context, four stands of inquiry emerge. First relates to of process of democratization after the removed of president Celal Bayar secondly reasons of military takeover in 1997, thirdly the military attempt which is launched some officer Loyal and it's called Fathullah Gulem movement and fourthly why democracy failed in to Turkey. These enable formulation of main research questions shown below.

01. Why the process of democratization started after the General Cemal Gursel?
02. How a gulf created in the civil military relations during the first tenure of Necmettin Erbakan ended up in the breakdown of civil control of military?
03. What was the regime outcome of Ismail Hakki Karadayi rule?
04. What has been the regional implication of Turkey democracy?

To answer these questions, following areas are investigated.

01. The process of political reconstruction after General Cemal Gursel with the focus on democratization and policies of political elite to gauge their effect on democratic consolidation and civil military relations.
02. The political developments in the backdrop of civil military relations during the first tenure of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to ascertain the circumstances which led to takeover by General Ismail Hakki Karadayi
03. The objectives and policies of General Ismail Hakki Karadayi to analyse the efficacy of his regime.
04. The role of judiciary in validating General Ismail Hakki Karadayi takeover and his subsequent failure to restore democracy.

Research Objectives:

It is clear that Turkey Military has pushed whole region towards uncertainty. Beside this conservative mind set of Military ethnic warlords have spared no space for ordinary people to take safe breath. This research studies military takeover, also called an institutional response counter coup with a view to understand the interface between process of democratization and civil military relation. It aims to achieve two main objectives firstly, to understand the responsibility of political and military leaders in consolidating democracy and nature democratic culture leading to positive regime outcomes. Secondly, how in a democratic framework, optimum civilian control over military can be achieved? At any rate, strong and pragmatic democratic system can engineer healthy and conducive environment for Turkey people where they can exploit their energies in productive and constructive way.

Literature Review:

A variety of literature from Primary and Secondary sources from diverse subject connected to civil military relations, military coups and regimes and methods for exercising democratic control over the military has been consulted in this research. Since, the thesis focuses on civil military relations, therefore the works related to this field is the starting point

Huntington in his seminal work analyzed growth of military in Europe and US and concluded that military is a profession like any other profession.

Significance of the Research:

This research aims to highlight the immediate implications on Turkey as a result civil military relation the study is significant for number of reasons first, there is paucity of theory guided research about military intervention in Turkey and there is none related to military intervention of 1997, this research fills this gap. It is well established fact that Turkey Soil has been turned into a civil military relation last 1997 to 2016, due to unbalanced internal and external factors. However, Turkey people have learnt that democracy is the only pillar that can heal the wounds of the long military intervention and withdrawal. This research paper will try its level best to diagnose the root causes in Turkey democracy and will pin down its remedy.

Scope and Limitations:

This research evaluation the time period from 1997 to 2016, through the prism of democratic consolidation and civil military relation. The actions and preferences of political elite and military leaders have been studied in this time period. The events leading up to military takeover of 1997, and its aftermath have been examined from theoretical perspective as well as societal perspective.

Research Methodology:

Research, in terms of reasoning, is classified into two types i.e. inductive and deductive. Inductive research relates to investigation of a new phenomenon on which little literature is available. In this type of research, a specific issue is evaluated to understand the general behavior of a certain event. Deductive research starts from the more general to the more specific. It is also termed as top-down approach where the researcher starts with a theory, for a confirmation or otherwise of the original theory. This research evaluates the civil military relations in a democratic framework which is a multidisciplinary subject and encompasses numerous theoretical explanations.

Research Design:

The research design and focus on either quantitative approach depends on research proposition. Generally, there are various types of research designs available in mixed method research and their selection depends upon the

research problem. The method is primarily used for confirmation, corroboration or cross validation within a single study. The literature review reveals that subject of civil military relations, majority of times, is studied either through qualitative approach or quantitative approach.

Military Regime:

The military despite better organizational and administrative skills lack technical expertise to govern. Hence, it must co-opt technocrats and politicians of dubious credentials and bear the political cost. Resultantly the initial positivity and impact of positive economic performance soon gets diluted in political issues. When hard political and impact of positive economic performance soon gets diluted in political issues. The modern history of the army began with its formation after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish military perceived itself as the guardian of Kemalist ideology, the official state ideology, especially of the secular aspects of Kemalism. After becoming a member of NATO on 18 February 1952, Turkey initiated a comprehensive modernization program for its armed forces. The Turkish Army sent troops to fight in the Korean War. Towards the end of the 1980s, a second restructuring process was initiated. The Turkish Armed Forces participate in EU Battlegroup under the control of the European Council, namely the Italian Romanian Turkish Battlegroup. The TAF also contributes operational staff of the Euro corps multinational army corps initiative of the EU and NATO.

The Turkish Armed Forces is the second largest standing military force in NATO, after the U.S. Armed Forces, with an estimated strength in 2015 of 639,551 militaries, civilian and paramilitary personnel. In 2010 the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that the Turkish Army had an established strength of approximately 402,000 active personnel, consisting of 77,000 professionals and 325,000 conscripts. A more recent estimate (2012) put the figure at 391,000. However, in October 2014 the Turkish Land Forces, Navy and Air Force had a combined strength of 412,691 personnel according to TLF's declaration. Turkey is one of five NATO member states which are part of the nuclear sharing policy of the alliance, together with Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.

Public Policies:

When the Turkish Armed Forces dissolved Parliament and took over the government on May 27, 1960, the Turkish Republic suffered its first violent crisis in its 38 years of existence. Both in Turkey and abroad there was widespread concern that this spelled the end of popular government for a long while to come. Now, after a year and half of military rule, Turkey is reverting to normal democratic processes. In the interim some attempts were made to perpetuate military government, but overwhelming public resistance nipped them in the bud in a referendum on July 9 the Turkish people voted themselves a new constitution and on October 29 the Second Republic will be officially baptized. But neither the Turks nor the world should be deluded into complacency.

Its significance is deeper than was seen in the referendum of July 9, when out of the 82.9 percent of the electorate which participated 38.3 percent voted against the constitution. That was a sizeable minority. However, the referendum was identified with the interim government and its deflationary policies which had resulted in a grave economic crisis. Unemployment was widespread; 50 percent of the country's industrial capacity was idle. There was a crisis in confidence because of new tax laws, vindictive discrimination against former supporters of the ousted Democrats, the decimation of the elite in the army and bureaucracy, and irresponsible haranguing against conscientious dissidents. Under these circumstances the favorable majority was considerable.

This confrontation has important foreign policy implications, partly in relations with the western democracies, where human rights groups and liberal opinion generally have been harshly critical of Turkish government policies, but also in the Middle East, thanks to existence of large Kurdish minorities in Iraq, Syria and Iran. While Kurdish separatism appears to have been a less powerful movement in Iran than in the other countries affected, it has resulted in the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, which now enjoys virtual independence, although it is constitutionally part of the Iraqi republic. This has crucial implications for Turkey, since the PKK has long used bases in Iraqi Kurdistan in support of its attacks in Turkish territory.

To undertake robust policy review and ensure that all stakeholders are on page there is a need for effective national security architecture. Recourse to such architecture would dispel the notions of division and block external propaganda aimed at weakening the state institutions and exploiting the divide. This will be discussed in subsequently.

Structural Dimensions:

The research had endeavored to understand why Huntington's separation theory and its application have not been effective in rendering the military apolitical in Turkey. It was found that the theory works fine when the threat is external, and military is not involved in internal security and national development.

Military in Turkey contrarily had been involved from the very outset in the Kurdish issue, internal security, in aid of civil power and national development. It has been hypothesized by Desh and Stephan that when the external as well as internal threat is high, and military is regularly involved in internal security and development duties then the civilian control becomes weak. Weakness is visible in number of ways. Absence of coups and military interventions do not imply that the control is good.

Democratic Control of Military:

The civilian control of military relates to three areas i.e. why, what and how. What comprises five decision areas (1) Civil military relations, (2) public policy, (3) internal security, (4) nation defense, (5) military organization. How relates to the degree and type of such control. The control can be best exercised through appropriate institutions at different levels.

Response to the why question resides in the ability to prevent military takeovers. This can be optimized by instituting a fresh oath to protect the constitution on assumption of office by joint and service chiefs to be administered by president of Turkey. The same should also be applied to the senior bureaucracy (Federal Secretaries).

In response to the second question for what to control, the premier institution to exercise such control is the parliament and in their respective committees related to defense and national security i.e. senate and national assembly.

What also relates to the appointments of the joint and service chiefs. The present system of selection for these appointments from the senior most

officers is appropriate and suits better than the seniority only system. However, no extensions in the tenure of these appointments should be allowed as a matter of principle and requisite constitutional change should be made to prevent recurrence.

The second level is the inter face of the military with the executive the findings and recommendations in this context are discussed under the heading of.

National Security Architecture:

The term civilian control of the military needs to be replaced with democratic control of military in all literature related to the subject used in Turkey. The conception of the term should be expanded not just the political elite but also the entire civil society as stake holders in the role of military as well as political elite. National Security Architecture.

Today a national security committee exists but it has been side lined in the process of implementation of Kurdish security plan. It has been replaced with arrangements military action against Kurdish. Therefore, there is a need to review the national security architecture, its structure and composition of committees. The recommendations should be legislated as constitutional consultative bodies.

Erdogan's new powers were greeted by an economic downturn sparked by a currency crisis. The political instability of recent years had introduced several vulnerabilities. Combined with populist economic measures, including an ambitious boom in public works projects and Erdogan's open opposition to raising interest rates, a financial downturn was already growing by the time of his reelection. Investor confidence was undermined further in July when Erdogan appointed his son-in-law as country's finance minister. Just weeks later the central bank declined to raise interest rates despite market pressures to do so. Then, on August 10, the United States announced tariffs against Turkish steel and aluminum exports. The lira took a hit with each event and lost a quarter of its value by mid-August. On September 13 the central bank relieved some of the tension by hiking interest rates and the value of the lira slowly improved. Still, the crisis caused a lingering slowdown in economic growth, and by 2016 the Turkish economy had entered into recession.

Healing the Relations:

In the context of civil military relations, the political and military elite have both erred in the past. This was found during the period under focus in this research and is also evident from general political history of Turkey. Continuing to remain engaged with the past events accentuates acrimony, which given the nature of our polity and civil military relations destabilizes and divides the society. This does not accord with the current requirement of civil military relations to eradicate terrorism and extremism from the country. Dictate that government should refer these matters to the military asking for internal review and necessary action to gather lessons, prevent recurrences and inform the defense committee of the parliament.

Summation:

The findings and recommendations documented above, relate to the outcomes of the research focused on a finite period 1997-2016 in the backdrop of definite theoretical and societal perspective. These provide food for thought and subjects for further research in the field of democracy and civil military relations. Consolidating democracy is a process, it demands consistent diligence, focus and foremost the right intentions. It emerges as an act in which each character institution must play its role. Turkey, therefore deserves smart dedicated leaders who while are well versed in the art of state craft but their heart beats with the down trodden. Leaders who can envision beyond their personal self.

Conclusion:

This research is an Endeavour to study the phenomenon of military coups in Turkey. It reviews the role of political elite during the decade of 90's and how they failed not only to consolidate democracy but also led to another military intervention in 2016. The consequent military regime with little technical expertise to govern, when faced with hard political questions succumbed and its efforts for self-legitimization and regime continuation were not different from the one it had displaced. It confirms that military elite when acting as political elite are no different. The research evaluates the state of civil military relations and mechanism for exercising civilian control over the military in the theoretical context of Huntington which has

been exercised in Turkey since inception but has not been effective in rendering the military apolitical. The research analyses the role of judiciary in validating coups and its inability to safeguard the basic structure of the constitution. In its contributions the research finds that 15th July 2016 Turk military attempt in elect Government which is launched some loyal and it's called Fathullah Gulem movement has started with the tanks suspension bridges in Istanbul and surrounding of key army force command posts Ankara as well as General Chief of Staff Quarters. In this case the push factor i.e. protecting the honor of the military as an institution was the primary reason. It also finds that the resultant military government was not able to contribute substantially to improve strategic stability; rather the military elite like political elite were driven by personal interest rather national.

References:

- Bayramoglu, Ali (2002) Turk Militarizmi. *Birikim*, 161(162): 29-48.
- BBC, Q/A: Turkey's Constitutional Referendum, 12.09.2010,
<http://www.bbc.Com/news/world-eu-rop-11228955>, 2.01.2017.
- Candar, Cengiz (27 June 1997). Post-modern darbe' Sabah (in Turkish).
Archived from the original on 23 November 2010. Retrieved 27 July
2008.
- Graham Brown, Sarah (1999). Sanctioning saddam: The Political of
intervention.
- Gulen Investigation (2016) Gulenist cult in USA. Account 31/10/2016.
Retrieved form [htt//guleninvestigation.com](http://guleninvestigation.com)
- Profile: Recep Tayyip Erdogan" BBC News. 18 July 2007 Retrieved 29
August 2008.
- Sarigil, Zeki (2011) Civil-Military Relation Beyond Dichotomy: With
Special Reference to Turkey; *Turkish Studies*,12(2):265-278.